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TRADITIONAL SENTENCING FACTORS V. ELEMENTS
OF AN OFFENSE: THE QUESTIONABLE VIABILITY OF
ALMENDAREZ-7TORRES V. UNITED STATES
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Al-
mendarez-Torres v. United States.' In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held,
in a 5-4 decision, that a judge may decide the fact of a defendant's
prior conviction, rather than a jury, for purposes of determining
whether a sentence should be imposed in excess of the statutory
maximum. The Court set forth three principal reasons for reaching
such a conclusion. The first, and seemingly most important, reason is
that recidivism has been a traditional basis for a sentencing court's
increase in an offender's sentence.4 Hence, it may serve as the
grounds for a sentence enhancement. 5 Second, recidivism should be
treated differently from other sentencing enhancement factors be-
cause "the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes
risks significant prejudice., 6 Third, although a factor may trigger an
increase in the maximum permissive sentence, as opposed to an in-
crease in the mandatory minimum sentence as seen in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,' that factor should not automatically require a greater
burden of proof, as it "does not systematically, or normally, work to
the disadvantage of a criminal defendant., 8 Accordingly, the Court
held that the factor of recidivism need not be included in the indict-
ment, nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt, even if that factor in-
1 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
2 The majority opinion was authored by Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
andJustices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Scalia,joined byJustices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg, dissented.
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27.
4 Id. at 231.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 554 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing Alrnendarez-Torres and the Court's rulings that recidivism is a traditional basis for increasing
an offender's sentence).
6 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235.
7 477 U.S. 79 (1986). In McMUllan v. Pentsylvania, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsyl-
vania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, which prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years upon a judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
"visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of certain enumerated offenses, all of which
carried maximum sentences of more than five years. Id. at 81.
8 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244.
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creases the criminal sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maxi-
9mum.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres, the
Court has decided three cases that cast serious doubt as to the con-
tinuing viability of Almendarez-Torres. The Supreme Court's rulings in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,' Blakely v. Washington," and Shepard v. United
States 2 have stripped away Almendarez-Torres's stare decisis value. In
the end, it is clear that Almendarez-Torres no longer has precedential
value. '3
I
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,14 decided only two years after Almendarez-
Torres, the Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a jury make any factual deter-
mination that authorizes an increase in the maximum prison sen-
tence for an offense based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 5
Specifically, Apprendi dealt with New Jersey's hate crime law,' 6 which
allowed a judge to increase a sentence to double the usual statutory
maximum if he or she found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant had acted with a purpose to intimidate an indi-
vidual or a group of individuals because of race. The Court held, in a
9 Id. at 227.
10 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
] 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
12 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005).
13 It is important to note that despite the questionable stare decisis value of Almendarez-
Torres, the lower federal courts have refused to address its continuing viability. The Supreme
Court in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), explained that despite a decision's "infirmities"
and "increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations," it is the "Court's prerogative alone to over-
rule one of its precedents." Khan, 522 U.S. at 20. As such, many federal courts, although in-
vited to address the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres, have refused to do so. See, e.g.,
United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that "until Almendarez-Torres is
overruled, we are bound by it."); United States v. Latorre-Benavides, 241 F.3d 262, 264 (2d Cir.
2001) (affirming the appellant's conviction on the basis of Almendarez-Torres); United States v.
Nava-Perez, 242 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Fifth Circuit cannot overrule the
Supreme Court's Alrmendarez-Torres precedent); United States v. Gatewood, 230 F.3d 186, 192
(6th Cir. 2000) (stating that "Almendarz-Torres remains the law."); United States v. Brough, 243
F.3d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001) (declaring that Apprendi has not overruled Almendarez-Torres,
and so the latter is still of precedential value); United States v. Raya-Ramirez, 244 F.3d 976, 977
(8th Cir. 2001) (noting the validity of the Almendarez-Torres decision even following Apprendi);
United States v. Wilson, 244 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Alrnendarez-Torres remains the
prevailing legal standard.... ."); United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1028, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001)
("[W]e are bound to follow Almendarez-Torres unless and until the Supreme Court itself over-
rules that decision.").
14 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
15 Id. at 469.
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-7 (a) (3), 2C:44-3(e) (West 2000).
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5-4 decision,17 that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."'
8
In its ruling, the Court attempted to distinguish Almendarez-Torres
from Apprendi. The Court explained that Almendarez-Torres, at most,
constituted a narrow exception to the general rule. 9 Furthermore,
the Court explained that "[w] hereas recidivism 'does not relate to the
commission of the offense' itself, NewJersey's biased purpose inquiry
goes precisely to what happened in the 'commission of the of-
fense.' 20 Moreover, the Court stated that "there is a vast difference
between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction en-
tered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to ajury
trial and... [proof of] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing
the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.
Despite the majority's efforts to distinguish Apprendi from Almen-
darez-Torres, the Apprendi Court's analysis casts doubt on the stare de-
cisis value of Almendarez-Torres. Specifically, the Apprendi Court does
damage to the distinction between "elements" and "sentencing fac-
tors." The majority wrote that "the relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty ver-
dict? '2 3 The Court goes on to state:
This is not to suggest that the term "sentencing factor" is devoid of mean-
ing. The term appropriately describes a circumstance, which may be ei-
ther aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sen-
tence within the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant
is guilty of a particular offense. On the other hand, when the term "sen-
tence enhancement" is used to describe an increase beyond the maxi-
mum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an
element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty
verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of an "ele-
ment" of the offense. 4
Hence, although the Court does not eradicate completely the distinc-
tion between "sentencing factors" and "elements of an offense," it
1: Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
and Ginsburg. Justices Scalia and Thomas added concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor wrote
a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Jus-
tice Breyer wrote a separate dissent as well.
18 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
19 Id. at 489-90.
20 Id. at 496 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998)).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 494.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 494 n.19.
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casts doubt as to the validity of Almendarez-Torres. This is because Ap-
prendi appears to weaken the principal reason the Almendarez-Torres
Court held that recidivism need not be included in the indictment
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt when it increases the sen-
tence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum: "recidivism ... is a
traditional... basis for... increasing an offender's sentence.'
Despite its attempt to distinguish Almendarez-Torres from Apprendi,
the majority in Apprendi expressed skepticism as to the future viability
of Almendarez-Torres. Justice Stevens, writing for the Apprendi majority,
stated: "it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided,
and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if
the recidivist issue were contested ... ."'6 Thus, it is evident that the
Apprendi majority called into question the precedential value of Al-
mnendarez-Torres.
Since Almendarez-Torres, the four Almendarez-Torres dissenters and
Justice Thomas have all expressed their belief that Almendarez-Torres
was decided in error. Justice Thomas, the only member of the Al-
mendarez-Torres majority to join the Apprendi majority, renounced his
vote with the majority in Almendarez-Torres and declared that the deci-
sion was in error. In his concurrence in Apprendi, Thomas wrote:
[O]ne of the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres---an error to which I
succumbed-was to attempt to discern whether a particular fact is tradi-
tionally (or typically) a basis for a sentencing court to increase an of-
fender's sentence. For the reasons I have given, it should be clear that
this approach just defines away the real issue. What matters is the way by
which a fact enters into the sentence. If a fact is by law the basis for im-
posing or increasing punishment-for establishing or increasing the
prosecution's entitlement-it is an element. (To put the point differ-
ently, I am aware of no historical basis for treating as a nonelement a fact
that by law sets or increases punishment.) When one considers the ques-
tion from this perspective, it is evident why the fact of a prior conviction
is an element under a recidivism statute. Indeed, cases addressing such
statutes provide some of the best discussions of what constitutes an ele-
ment of a crime. One reason frequently offered for treating recidivism
differently, a reason on which we relied in Almendarez-Torres is a concern
for prejudicing the jury by informing it of the prior conviction. But this
concern, of which earlier courts were well aware, does not make the tra-
ditional understanding of what an element is any less applicable to the
fact of a prior conviction.
Thomas's abandonment of his position in Apprendi means that five
sitting justices are now on the record as saying Almendarez-Torres was
25 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243.
26 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90.
27 Id. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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not decided correctly. Therefore, were the Court to revisit the issue,
it would likely overturn Almendarez-Torres.
II
In Blakely v. Washington,28 the Supreme Court expanded the Ap-
prendi rule to include sentences that are above sentencing guidelines
but below statutory maximums. Blakely "was sentenced to prison for
more than three years beyond what the law allowed for the crime to
which he confessed, on the basis of' a judge's finding, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, "that he had acted with 'deliberate cru-
elty.'29 The Court held that such action was unconstitutional, stating:
The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before
depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer
the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to 'the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,' rather than a lone em-
ployee of the State.30
In other words, a jury must find not only the facts that make up the
crime with which the offender is charged, but also all punishment-
increasing factors3 1 As a result of Blakely, the Court now requires
identical treatment of a "traditional sentencing factor" and an "ele-
ment of a greater offense," 2 yet the exception of recidivism remains.
After Blakely, the recidivism exception becomes even more prob-
lematic, since the decision appears to have eliminated completely the
distinction between a traditional sentencing factor and an element of
a greater offense, such that now, "any fact that increases the upper
bound on a judge's sentencing discretion is an element of the of-
fense," even if that fact was a traditional basis for increasing an of-
fender's sentence. 33 As discussed previously, the fact that recidivism is
"a traditional bas [i]s for increasing an offender's sentence," and thus
a traditional sentencing factor, appears to be the primary reason that
the Almendarez-Torres Court held that recidivism need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt when it is grounds for a sentence en-
2s 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2 Id. at 2543.
30 Id. (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *343).
31 Id. The holding in Blakely is not limited to Washington's Sentencing Reform Act. See
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that Apprendi and Blakely apply to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines such that any factor, other than recidivism, needed to sup-
port a sentence beyond the maximum had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to ajury or
be admitted by a defendant).
32 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent gives the best explana-
tion of the majority's holding in Blakely. See id. at 2543 (stating that, in the majority opinion,
"[t]he Court says to Congress and state legislatures: If you want to constrain the sentencing dis-
cretion ofjudges and bring some uniformity to sentencing, it will cost you-dearly").
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hancement. Blakely seems to have eliminated the principal reason
the Almendarez-Torres Court held that recidivism need not be included
in the indictment nor proved beyond a reasonable a doubt. There-
fore, Blakely casts further doubt as to the stare decisis value of Almen-
darez-Torres.
35
III
In Shepard v. United States,3 the Court addressed whether a sen-
tencing court, acting pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), 37 can examine police reports or complaints to determine
whether a prior guilty plea to burglary counts as a prior conviction of
a "violent felony." The ACCA mandates a fifteen-year minimum sen-
tence for any person found to have committed certain federal fire-
arms violations if that person has three prior convictions for "violent
felonies. 3 9 Congress has specified that the term "violent felony" in-
cludes "burglary," and the Court in Taylor v. United States,a0 held that
the ACCA's use of the term "burglary" encompasses only "generic
burglary.",
4
A "burglary" is a "generic burglary" if three elements are present:
"[i] unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, [ii] a build-
ing or structure, [iii] with intent to commit a crime. 42 In Taylor, the
Court stated that a sentencing court, in determining whether a previ-
ous trial-based conviction is for a "generic burglary," can look to the
statutory definition, charging documents and jury instructions. 43 Tay
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 231 (1998).
35 It is interesting to note that in her dissent in Blakely, Justice O'Connor seems to imply that
after Blakely an exception for recidivism no longer exists. She writes:
[T]here are additional costs. For example, a legislature might rightly think that some
factors bearing on sentencing, such as prior bad acts or criminal history, should not be
considered in a jury's determination of a defendant's guilt-such "character evidence"
has traditionally been off limits during the guilt phase of criminal proceedings because
of its tendency to inflame the passions of the jury. If a legislature desires uniform con-
sideration of such factors at sentencing, but does not want them to impact a jury's initial
determination of guilt, the State may have to bear the additional expense of a separate,
full-blown jury trial during the penalty phase proceeding.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2546 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (joined by Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist).
125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005).
37 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000 & Supp. 112002).
38 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1254.
39 Id.
40 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
41 See id. at 598-99 (stating that burglary is the generic definition of the crime, not a special
subclass of the generic crime).
42 Id. at 599.
43 Id. at 602.
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lor, then, does not require that recidivism be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt for purposes of sentencing pursuant to the ACCA.
The Court in Shepard, however, refused to expand Taylor to allow a
sentencing court to examine the police record and complaint to de-
termine whether an earlier guilty plea to burglary counts as a "generic
burglary," and thus a "violent felony," for purposes of sentencing pur-
suant to the ACCA.44
Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the Court, except as to
Part III, 45 concluded that judicial enquiry under the ACCA, as to
whether a guilty plea to burglary is a "violent felony," "is limited to
the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement
or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the
factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some
comparable judicial record of this information., 46 Thus, the Court
effectively held that recidivism, in a situation such as Shepard where
neither the terms of the charging document, plea agreement, nor
colloquy between the judge and the defendant confirm the factual
basis for the plea, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt if used to impose a sentence pursuant to the ACCA.
Accordingly, recidivism in the Shepard context must now be treated as
a substantive element of the offense to be determined by a jury,
rather than as a "traditional sentencing factor."
The Court's efforts to distinguish Shepard appear, in part, to be a
pretense. In Part III of the plurality opinion, Justice Souter attempts
to distinguish the situation found in Shepard from all other situations
where a jury need not find the factor of recidivism beyond a reason-
able doubt. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Ginsburg, explained that the fact of a prior conviction in
the Shepard context lacks the "conclusive significance of a prior judi-
cial record" because the sentencingjudge would have to "make a dis-
puted finding of fact about what the defendant and the state judge
must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.,
47
However, despite the purported reason of unreliability given by
Justice Souter, it appears that one underlying reason for the decision
was a desire not to further expand Almendarez-Torres. Although there
44 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. It is important to note that this situation arises only when deal-
ing with states, such as Massachusetts, where the state statute's definition of "generic burglary" is
overbroad for the purposes of the ACCA, in that the statute punishes both non-generic and ge-
neric burglary. Id.
45 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Scalia joined the opinion in full, and Justice Thomas
joined except as to Part III. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Kennedy and
Breyerjoined. ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not take part in the decision.
46 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1263.
47 Id. at 1262.
1235Oct. 20051
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
may be some situations in which a defendant's guilty plea is premised
on substantially different facts than those that were the basis for the
original police report, making it unclear whether the guilty plea con-
stitutes a prior conviction of a "violent felony," there is no evidence of
48that situation in Shepard. Moreover, the "majority of the Court now
recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided., 49 Therefore,
it is likely that the plurality was motivated, at least in part, by the un-
certain viability of Almendarez-Tores, and hence, a desire not to fur-
ther expand its application.
By requiring that recidivism in the Shepard context be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, Shepard does further damage to the already
damaged distinction between "traditional sentencing factors" and
"elements of the offense." In so holding, despite recidivism's tradi-
tional function as a basis for a sentencing court's increase in an of-
fender's sentence, Shepard completely destroys the principal reason-
ing relied upon by the Almendarez-Torres Court in finding that a judge
may decide the fact of a defendant's prior conviction, rather than a
jury, for purposes of determining whether a sentence should be im-
posed beyond the statutory maximum for the particular crime. 5°
Thus, the fact that recidivism is a traditional sentencing factor is no
longer a valid reason for the Court to hold that recidivism need not
be set forth in the indictment and need not be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt as would any element of the offense.
Justice Thomas's failure to join Part III of the Shepard opinion fur-
ther demonstrates that Almendarez-Torres no longer has stare decisis
value. His reason for refusing to join Part III was because of his belief
that recidivism, in any context, must always be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.5' Justice Thomas explained that permitting a sentenc-
ing judge to determine the fact of recidivism, whether confined to
the situation of Taylor or expanded to the situation of Shepard, gives, • . . ,2
"rise to constitutional error." Justice Thomas stated clearly and cor-
rectly that the logic of the Court's rulings since Almendarez-Torres leads
to the conclusion that any factor that increases a defendant's sen-
tence beyond the statutory maximum, including recidivism, must be
included in the indictment, tested before a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.53 Thus, Justice Thomas's concurrence in Shepard
further demonstrates that Almendarez-Torres lacks stare decisis value.
48 See id. at 1264 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (discussing why it is not at all disputed that
Shepard's previous burglary pleas count as "generic burglaries" for purposes of the ACCA).
49 Id. at 1264 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying note 27.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998).
-1 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1263-64 (Thomas, J., concurring).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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IV
Despite the problematic reasoning used by the Court in Almen-
darez-Torres, there is still a question of whether the unique characteris-
tics of recidivism make it possible that the Court, should it revisit the
issue, will hold that recidivism, except in the context of Shepard, need
not be included in the indictment nor proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In two separate cases, Apprendi and Jones v. United States,54 the
Supreme Court recognized that recidivism normally has characteris-
tics that other sentence-enhancing factors do not have; specifically,
prior convictions represent the outcome of earlier proceedings in
which the defendant was afforded procedural safeguards such as a
trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.55 Although Almen-
darez-Torres does not ground its decision on these protections, some
Justices, should the court revisit the issue, may decide that the recidi-
vism exception, except in a Shepard context, should remain, since
previous convictions were adjudicated pursuant to proceedings which
provided substantial procedural safeguards in satisfaction of the Due
Process Clause.
Despite the difference between recidivism and other sentence-
enhancing factors, it is unlikely that the Court, should it revisit the is-
sue, will hold that recidivism need not be included in the indictment
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. First, as discussed above, at
least five justices currently sitting on the Court have expressed their
belief that Almendarez-Torres was decided wrongly. 6  Second, even
though the Shepard plurality expressed a belief that a conviction by a
jury can provide greater protection than a plea agreement in the
Shepard context, the plurality does not explicitly state that it sees these
protections as sufficient to prevent constitutional violations. Rather,
the Court merely states that the protections in place in the Shepard
context are insufficient. Accordingly, it appears unlikely that the
unique characteristics of recidivism will impact the majority decision,
should the Court revisit the issue.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has cast considerable doubt as to the continu-
ing viability of Almendarez-Torres. Three cases decided subsequent to
Almendarez-Torres demonstrate that the Court has called into question
whether Almendarez-Torres should be given any stare decisis value.
54 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
55 Jones, 526 U.S. at 249.
56 See Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1264 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("A majority of the Court now rec-
ognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.").
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Moreover, it appears that should the Court revisit the issue presented
in Almendarez-Torres, it will hold that any factor that increases a defen-
dant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, even re-
cidivism, must be included in the indictment, presented to the jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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